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I Don't Trust Your Judgment: The
European Convention on Human Rights
Meets the European Union on New
Grounds?
Michael R. Ribble*
I. SETTING THE STAGE
In June 2009, the European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR")
handed down a decision against the French Banking Commission
("FBC") for a violation of Article 6 of the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention").' The
applicant, a French investment company, alleged that the FBC failed to
act as an independent tribunal during its proceedings as required by the
2Convention. The ECHR's decision was in some ways surprising but
was consistent with its broad view of businesses' rights under the
Convention.3 The full impetus of the decision, though, is not readily
apparent until it is considered in light of the human-rights movement in
Europe.
Human-rights enforcement in Europe began after the conclusion of
World War II, when the Convention was ratified by ten countries in the
Council of Europe. 4 After the Convention was passed, the human-rights
movement continued to expand, and now forty-seven countries are
* J.D. Candidate 2011, The Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania State
University.
1. See generally Dubus S.A. v. France, App. No. 5242/04 (2009),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (type "Dubus S.A." in the
Case Title line).
2. See id. 45.
3. MICHAEL Dov GOLDHABER, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 176 (Rutgers University Press 2007).
4. See Human Rights Education Association, History, http://www.hrea.org/
index.php?baseid=143 (last visited Jan. 5, 2010); Council of Europe Website, History,
http://www.echr.coe.int/library/COLENcedh.html
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signatories to the Convention. Moreover, the introduction of the
European Union ("EU") in 1993 created additional enforcement regimes
that recognized the existence of fundamental human rights.
The EU, like the ECHR, has grown considerably, including citizens
from twenty-seven countries.7 Each EU member state is also a party to
the Convention.8 However, while the EU has considered the Convention
to be a valid source of human-rights law, the EU itself is not bound by
it. 9 On December 1, 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon ("Treaty") became
effective, under which the EU will accede to the Convention and the
ECHR.10 This accession presumably will subject the EU and its
institutions to the laws and jurisdiction of the ECHR, to which they have
not been subject in the past.'
Against the backdrop of accession, Dubus S.A. v. France may be an
important precedent with respect to possible applications lodged against
EU institutions. In particular, the facts and reasoning of Dubus appear
applicable to certain EU institutions. After accession, such institutions
could find themselves subject to ECHR proceedings.
This Comment will first discuss the background of and the
application process under the ECHR. Next, the Dubus decision will be
analyzed to provide a basis for comparison in Part IV. Further, this
Comment will outline the pre- and post-EU-accession difficulties
concerning the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") and the ECHR.
Finally, in light of Dubus and accession, this Comment compares, in Part
IV, the FBC with the EU Commission on Competition ("ECC") in
antitrust proceedings, and suggests that similarities in procedure and
sanctions are possible grounds for ECC liability under the Convention.
5. Council of Europe Website (List of Countries), http://www.coe.int/aboutCoe/
index.asp?page=47paysleurope&l=en (last visited Feb. 3, 2010).
6. See e.g. European Commission Website, External Relations, http://ec.europa.eu/
external relations/humanrights/index en.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2010).
7. European Commission Website, External Relations- Who, http://ec.europa.eu/
external relations/peacesecurity/who.en.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2010).
8. See MICHAEL Dov GOLDHABER, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN COURT
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 176-77 (Rutgers University Press 2007).
9. Id.
10. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, art. VI § 2, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1,
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:
0010:0041:EN:PDF; see also Lisbon-Treaty.org-Ratification, http://www.lisbon-
treaty.org/wcm/ratification.html.
11. See GOLDHABER,supra note 8, at 176-77.
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A. Background: The European Court ofHuman Rights
The original incarnation of the ECHR, the Court of Human Rights,
was established in 1959, six years after the ratification of the Convention
in 1953.2 The ECHR's current form was adopted in 1998 and replaced
the previous enforcement mechanisms.13 The Convention is an
international treaty ratified by all member states of the Council of
Europe1 4 and is meant to serve as Europe's equivalent of the United
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).' 5  As such,
each state, by ratifying the Convention, agrees to uphold certain
fundamental human rights outlined therein. 16  The ECHR has the
authority to impose binding judgments against member states for
violations of the Convention.17  Once a final judgment is entered, the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe is then responsible for
supervising the execution of the judgment as it applies to both parties.' 8
For example, the Committee of Ministers will ensure that any monetary
award is actually paid and that each party adheres to the judgment's
stipulations. 19
B. European Court ofHuman Rights: Standing and Procedure
1. Standing Under the ECHR
While the Convention tends to follow the dictates of the UDHR, its
articles suggest a broader view of human rights, particularly with respect
to who may apply to the ECHR for relief.20 While the Convention's
12. See European Court of Human Rights Website, Facts and Figures 1,
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/ACF07093-1937-49AF-8BE6-36FEOFEE1759/0/
FactsAndFiguresENGlOansNov.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2010) [hereinafter ECHR Facts
and Figures].
13. See id.
14. For a full list of the member states in the Council of Europe see id. at 12-13. See
also Council of Europe Website (List of Countries), http://www.coe.int/aboutCoe/
index.asp?page=47paysleurope&l=en (last visited Jan. 2, 2010).
15. See European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms pmbl.,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/
D5CC24A7-DC 13-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/EnglishAnglais.pdf.
16. See ECHR Facts and Figures, supra note 12, at 1.
17. See European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra
note 15, at arts. 32 and 46.
18. See id.
19. ECHR Facts and Figures, supra note 12, at 3.
20. Compare European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
supra note 15, at 4 (indicating that "individual" applications alleging violations of the
Convention include any person, non-governmental organization or group of individuals),
with Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d
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definition of "individual applicants" appears more inclusive than the
UDHR, for the purposes of submitting an application to the ECHR, the
requirements are essentially the same for all individual applicants.2'
The ECHR accepts individual applications (both domestic and
abroad) filed within six months of a final state judgment that allege:
(1) a violation of the Convention or one of its Protocols (not a general
complaint about a law); (2) a violation by one of the member states,
which occurred within the jurisdiction of the state; and (3) an attempt by
the applicant to exhaust all remedies within the state.22 Furthermore, an
individual applicant must claim to have been personally and directly the
victim of the alleged Convention violation.2 3 As such, an individual may
not lodge an application on behalf of others, except when he or she is
24
acting as the official representative for a clearly identified group.
Finally, the complainant must raise the issue of a Convention violation
during member-state proceedings.25 Thus, the ECHR does not serve as
the court of first instance for violations of the Convention.26 Rather, the
alleged violation will be heard by multiple tribunals or courts (usually
ending with the state high court) before reaching the ECHR.
2. Procedural Posture of Individual Applications
After an individual has exhausted all remedies within the state, an
application may be lodged with the ECHR.28 Once received, the
application may be reviewed by a committee of three judges, a chamber
of seven judges, or a Grand Chamber of seventeen judges.2 9  The
threshold determination for any application before the ECHR is
admissibility. 30  However, the court may find the application
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) arts. 1-30 (focusing on individual
"human beings").
21. See European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra
note 15, at art. 34.
22. European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note
15, at art. 35. See also, European Court of Human Rights Website, Questions and
Answers, http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/37C26BFO-EE46-437E-B810-EA900D
18D49B/0/ENG QuestionsandAnswers.pdf 3-4 (last visited Jan. 2, 2010) [hereinafter
ECHR Questions and Answers].
23. ECHR Questions and Answers, supra note 22, at 4.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note
15, at art. 35 § 1.
27. ECHR Questions and Answers, supra note 22, at 4.
28. See European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra
note 15, at art. 35(1).
29. See id. at art. 27 § 1.
30. See European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra
note 15, at arts. 28-29. See also ECHR Questions and Answers, supra note 22, at 5.
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inadmissible at any time during the proceedings.31 Admissibility will be
based upon the requirements listed in the Convention.32
A committee of three may declare an application inadmissible by a
unanimous vote where no further examination is required, and such a
declaration is final.33 If a committee of three does not reach a decision, a
chamber of seven will consider both the admissibility and merits of the
application,3 4 though the issue of admissibility is considered separately.
If admissibility is established, the chamber will attempt to foster a
friendly settlement between the parties. 6 Only when parties fail to reach
an agreement will the chamber make a determination on the matter, and
such a determination is generally final.37 However, in exceptional
circumstances, one of the parties may request that the case be referred to
the Grand Chamber. 3 8 In that case, a five-judge panel will determine
whether the case presents a sufficiently important question regarding the
interpretation of the Convention or one of its Protocols, or "a serious
issue of general importance."3 9  If the panel accepts the referral, the
Grand Chamber will make a judgment on the case that is final.40
Similarly, if a chamber of seven considers the issues of the case to be
sufficiently important or controversial, they may relinquish jurisdiction
in favor of the Grand Chamber before rendering a decision, unless one of
the parties objects.4 1
Any final judgment rendered by the ECHR is considered binding.42
The court, however, is not the mechanism for enforcement.43 Rather, the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe is responsible for
enforcing ECHR judgments.44 Generally, judgments are only in the form
of monetary damages or just satisfaction.45 Moreover, the ECHR does
not have the authority to overrule state-court decisions or to annul state
31. See European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra
note 15, at art. 35 § 4.
32. See id at art. 35.
33. See id. at art. 28.
34. See id. at art. 29 § 1.
35. See id. at art. 29 § 3.
36. See European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra
note 15, at art. 38 § 2.
37. See id. at arts. 43 and 44.
38. See id. at art. 43 § 1.
39. See id. at art. 43 § 2.
40. See id. at arts. 43 § 3 and 44.
41. See European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra
note 15, at art. 30.
42. See id. at art. 46.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id. at art. 41; see also ECHR Questions and Answers, supra note 22, at 5.
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laws.46 Therefore, an individual may receive a damage award from the
ECHR but still have to meet the stipulations of a state-court decision.47
Despite the possible limitations on remedies, the ECHR remains an
avenue of relief when other options are foreclosed. Dubus exercised this
option when its appeal to the French high court failed.
II. DUBUS S.A. v. FRANCE
A. Facts and Procedure
Dubus S.A. is a financial company headquartered in Lille, France,
that specializes in executing trade orders for third parties.4 8 In 1997 the
inspector ("MR") for the FBC opened an investigation against Dubus.49
As a result, Dubus changed its administrative and accounting procedures,
and a subsequent audit showed no anomalies.o
In February and March of 2000, inspector MR again investigated
Dubus.51 As a result of the investigation, the General Secretariat of the
FBC issued a letter to Dubus, outlining regulatory offenses regarding
Dubus's "minimum capital investment providers."5 2 A draft inspection
report was sent as well.s3 Dubus's chairman of the board of directors
responded to the allegations that August.54 Inspector MR then filed his
final inspection report, 5 in light of which the FBC decided to initiate
disciplinary proceedings against Dubus.5 6 The president of the FBC
notified Dubus of the commission's decision in November. In the
letter, the president outlined multiple regulatory offenses found in
inspector MR's report.58 The same day, the chairman of the FBC sent a
letter to Dubus outlining two additional complaints.59 Dubus responded
to all of the complaints in a letter to the FBC General Secretariat in
December.60 On June 1, 2001, the General Secretariat submitted reply
comments to Dubus and invited the company to appear before the FBC
46. See ECHR Questions and Answers, supra note 22, at 6.
47. See id. at 6.
48. See Dubus, App. No. 5242/04, supra note 1, 5.
49. See id. 6.
50. See id.
51. See id T7.
52. See id. T 8.
53. See Dubus, App. No. 5242/04, supra note 1, 9.
54. See id. N 10.
55. See id. 11.
56. See id. 12.
57. See id. T 13.
58. See Dubus, App. No. 5242/04, supra note 1, 13.
59. See id. T 14.
60. See id. T 15.
216 [Vol. 29:1
I DON'T TRUST YOUR JUDGMENT
in July and submit any further comments.' Subsequently, Dubus
submitted comments challenging the propriety of the disciplinary
proceedings under Article 6 Section 162 of the Convention and criticizing
the overlap between various FBC functions and procedures.
Regardless, the FBC reached a decision in October 2001 and issued
Dubus an official reprimand, which was delivered by the Secretariat
General.64 Dubus then appealed the FBC decision to the French Council
of State.65 In 2003, the Council of State denied Dubus's appeal, finding
that sufficient safeguards were afforded to the defendant under the
66Convention. As a result, Dubus lodged an application with the ECHR
in January 2004.67
B. The ECHR Decision
1. Threshold Inquiry
Dubus's application to the ECHR was considered by a chamber of
seven judges. 6 8 As an initial matter, the chamber considered whether
Article 669 of the Convention was applicable to the FBC proceedings.7 0
First, the court noted that the Convention had applied to similarly
situated French administrative authorities, such as the Competition
Council.7 1 Second, the court found that the FBC sanctions could be
construed as "criminal charges" under the Convention.72 In making this
finding, the court applied the three factors outlined in Engel and Others
v. Netherlands: (1) the legal definition of a crime under domestic law;
(2) the nature of the offense; and (3) the degree of severity of the
sanction to the firm.73 The court focused its analysis on the third factor,
61. See id. 16.
62. See European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra
note 15, at art. 6 § 1. In particular, art 6 § 1 reads: In the determination of his civil rights
and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal
established by law.
63. See id. 17.
64. See Dubus, App. No. 5242/04, supra note 1, 18.
65. See id. 19.
66. See id. 20.
67. See id. 1.
68. See id.
69. See text of art. 6 § 1 accompanying note 62.
70. See Dubus, App. No. 5242/04, supra note 1, $ 33-38.
71. See id. 35.
72. See id. 36.
73. See id.; see Engel and Others v. Netherlands, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) T$ 82-85,
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (type "Engel" in
the Case Title line).
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noting that the French statute allowed for severe penalties against
Dubus.74 Moreover, the degree of severity is measured by the sanctions
allowed - not the ones ultimately imposed.7 5 Therefore, the severity of
the sanctions against Dubus warranted a finding of criminal charges.76
Finally, the court determined that based upon Sramek v. Austria, the FBC
fell into the category of a "tribunal" under the Convention. The court's
initial findings simply stated that Article 6 Section 1 of the Convention
was implicated in Dubus.7 8  The court then considered the merits of
Dubus's claim.79
2. The Merits
In its application to the ECHR, Dubus argued that the FBC
disciplinary proceedings violated Article 6 Section 1 of the Convention.80
Specifically, Dubus alleged that it had not received a fair hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal.8 ' In support of its application, Dubus
questioned the lack of distinction between the FBC's indictment,
investigation, and trial functions. For example, the General Secretariat
participated in issuing the administrative warnings, sending the reply
brief as part of the judicial proceedings, and sat as the rapporteur in the
court proceedings. Thus, an inference existed that the General
84Secretariat was a party to the deliberations on Dubus's case. Dubus
essentially argued that the case was prejudged.
The chamber of seven noted that whether the FBC was an impartial
tribunal depended upon the subjective interests of the judge and objective
considerations of the proceedings. However, the court focused on the
objective considerations because Dubus failed to argue that the FBC
judge was subjectively partial. Therefore, the court considered all
74. See Dubus, App. No. 5242/04, supra note 1, 37.
75. See id.
76. See id. T 38.
77. See id.; see also Sramek v. Austria, 84-I Eur Ct HR (ser A) § 36 (1984),
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (type "Sramek"
in the Case Title line).
78. See Dubus, App. No. 5242/04, supra note 1, 38.
79. See id. 53.
80. See id. 45.
81. See id. T 46-49.
82. See id.
83. See Dubus, App. No. 5242/04, supra note 1, I 46-49.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id. T 14.
87. See id. T 53.
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aspects of the proceedings to determine whether the FBC could render an
unbiased decision about disciplinary actions.
The court concluded that the General Secretariat's role in both the
investigative and disciplinary aspects of the proceedings raised a
reasonable doubt that the FBC was an independent and impartial
tribunal. 89  The court noted the entire chain of events leading to the
FBC's sanction, particularly the ambiguity of the General Secretariat's
role.90 The court also noted that the governing documents for the
composition and powers of the various bodies within the FBC were
vague. 91 Thus, the French government's argument that the General
Secretariat was an independent actor in the FBC was not persuasive.92
The court reasoned that the conflation of roles within the FBC
reasonably could lead Dubus to believe that the same individuals acted as
prosecutor and judge in the proceedings.93 Finally, the court indicated
that the FBC had the burden of erasing any impression during its
proceedings that a party's guilt had been assumed from the beginning,
and in Dubus's case the FBC fell short.94
C. Implications ofDubus
Viewed against the backdrop of the current European legal
landscape,95 Dubus may have far-reaching implications. First, by
accepting Dubus's application, the ECHR adopted a rather sympathetic
view of business rights by finding that Dubus met the Article 6 Section 1
threshold requirements.9 6 For example, in determining that the monetary
damages against Dubus rendered the proceedings criminal, the court
applied a relatively subjective test.97 The court noted that at a certain
point such sanctions became criminal; however, the ECHR failed to
illustrate at what point monetary damages become punitive.98 Thus, it
appears that the ECHR will use some level of discretion in making such
88. See Dubus, App. No. 5242/04, supra note 1, TT 55-60.
89. See id. 61.
90. See id. I 55-60.
91. See id. 56.
92. See id. 61.
93. See Dubus, App. No. 5242/04, supra note 1, 60.
94. See id. TT 60-61.
95. In particular, focusing on the Treaty of Lisbon and EU accession to the ECHR.
96. See Dubus, App. No. 5242/04, supra note 1, TT 36-37; see European Convention
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 15, at art. 6; see also Sramek v.
Austria, supra note 77, § 36; see also Engel and Others v. Netherlands, supra note 73, at
82-85.
97. See Dubus, App. No. 5242/04, supra note 1, 36-37.
98. See id. % 37-38.
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determinations.99 Future litigants, analogous to Dubus, may find the
court receptive to arguments concerning the threshold requirements for
Article 6 Section I of the Convention to apply.
Second, the ECHR's analysis of impartiality may affect agencies
other than the FBC. Agencies in France and other European countries
likely have procedures or functions similar to the FBC's. 00  For
example, the EU Competition Commission's procedures in antitrust
cases appear similar to the FBC's in that they fail to clearly delineate
investigative and judicial functions within the agency.10' Furthermore,
current applications on the ECJ and ECHR dockets feature arguments
similar to those advanced in Dubus.102
Finally, Dubus has the potential to become binding precedent not
only on the members of the Council of Europe but also on the EU.'o3
Since its inception, the Convention has applied to all signatories of the
Council of Europe, which includes all member states of the EU. 104
However, the EU itself is not a signatory.10 5 But on December 1, 2009,
the Treaty of Lisbon became effective. 106 One provision of the Treaty
declares that the EU will accede to the ECHR.'o7 The ECHR, therefore,
should garner authority in the EU concerning human rights.'08
99. See id. IT 36-38.
100. See id. 35 (noting that other French administrative authorities' sanctions
rendered their proceedings criminal as well).
101. This is discussed later in the comment, and it is argued that they are analogous,
but generally compare Commission Regulation 773/2004, 2004 O.J. (L123) (EC),
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:123:
0018:0024:EN:PDF [hereinafter Commission Regulation 773/2004], with Banque de
France Fact Sheet, available at http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/supervi/telechar/
combanc061204.pdf [hereinafter FBC Fact Sheet].
102. See Charles Forelle, Report on Business, Intel says EU fine violated rights,
WALL ST. J., Jul. 23, 2009, at 1.
103. See Peter van Dijk, Commentary at the European Commission for Democracy
Through Law, On the Accession of the European Union/European Community to the
European Convention on Human Rights T 6 (Oct. 12, 2007), http://www.venice.coe.int/
docs/2007/CDL(2007)096-e.pdf [hereinafter Van Dijk Commentary].
104. See GOLDHABER,supra note 8, at 176-77.
105. See id.
106. See Lisbon-Treaty.org-Ratification, http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/
ratification.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2010).
107. Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
establishing the European Community, supra note 10, at art. VI § 2.
108. See Van Dijk Commentary, supra note 103, 1 14.
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III. EU ACCESSION
A. BriefHistory ofEU Courts and the ECHR
Because the EU is not a signatory to the Convention, it traditionally
has not considered itself bound by ECHR decisions. 1 09 Each member
state of the EU, though, is bound by EU obligations and also by the
Convention. 110 In this regard, member states of the EU are in a
precarious situation where they are bound to abide by both EU law and
the Convention."' It is possible, for example, that a state could
implement an EU regulation and simultaneously violate the
Convention.1 12 Such a scenario has yet to occur.1 13
Still, in cases concerning the Community law of the EU, the ECJ
has interpreted the Convention to resolve a number of cases, and the
ECJ's analysis has led to inconsistencies between the two courts. 114
Thus, although the ECJ generally follows the ECHR's lead," 5 a system
of dual interpretations of the Convention has arisen.11 6
The ECHR has taken the view that cases concerning EU law should
comport with the Convention, but the ECHR usually will defer to the
EU's protection of human rights unless the ECHR finds such protection
to be "manifestly deficient."' 1 7 The ECHR tends to give broad discretion
to the ECJ, as the level of protection for human rights needs to be
"comparable," not identical." 8 But such deference does not mean that
the ECHR will find itself unable to review decisions concerning EU law
with respect to human rights under the Convention. 1 9
In Senator Lines GmBH v. Austria, the ECHR narrowly avoided a
confrontation with the EU courts. 120 In Senator Lines, the ECHR was
tasked with determining whether an EU Commission's antitrust
109. See GOLDHABER, supra note 8, at 176-77.
110. See Van Dijk Commentary, supra note 103, 1 10-11.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See infra note 119; this situation has come close.
114. See GOLDHABER, supra note 8, at 176-77.
115. See Justice John L. Murray, Speech: Fundamental Rights in the European
Community Legal Order, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 531, 538 (2009).
116. See GOLDHABER,supra note 8, at 176-77.
117. Bosphorus v. Ireland, 42 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 1 156 (2005), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp 1 97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (type "Bosphorus" in the
Case Title line).
118. Id.1155.
119. See id. 156-57.
120. See GOLDHABER, supra note 8, at 176-77. See generally Senator Lines GmBH v.
Austria, App. No. 56672/00 13, available at http://www.menschenrechte.ac.at/orig/
04_2/SenatorEUZE.pdf.
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proceedings violated the Convention.121 Before the ECHR rendered a
decision, the European Court of First Instance rescinded the monetary
sanctions against the applicant, Senator Lines, thus stripping it of the
injury requirement in the ECHR proceedings.122 Therefore, the issue of
which court is the final arbiter of the Convention remains unresolved.12 3
B. Conflicts in Convention Interpretation: ECJ v. ECHR
While the ECJ generally will follow ECHR decisions,124 it has
diverged from the ECHR on a number of issues.125 For example, the ECJ
generally has narrowly construed the rights of businesses under Article
Six and Article Eight of the Convention.12 6 The ECHR, conversely, has
recognized broader rights for businesses. 12 For example, the ECJ has
found that Article Six of the Convention offers no protection against
giving evidence against oneself,12 8 whereas the ECHR has recognized
such rights and extended them to discovery requests.' 29 Furthermore, the
ECJ has been more willing to uphold government raids of businesses
under Article Eight,130 whereas the ECHR has reached the opposite
conclusion.131 With the EU's accession to the Convention through
Treaty of Lisbon ("Treaty"), however, such divergences in interpretation
may be reconciled.132
121. See GOLDHABER, supra note 8, at 176-77. See generally Senator Lines, App. No.
56672/00 13, supra note 120.
122. See GOLDHABER, supra note 8, at 176-77. See generally Senator Lines, App. No.
56672/00 13, supra note 120.
123. See GOLDHABER,supra note 8, at 176-77. See generally Senator Lines, App. No.
56672/00 13, supra note 120.
124. See Justice John L. Murray, Speech, supra note 115, at 538.
125. See GOLDHABER, supra note 8, at 177.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See Case 374/87, Orkem v. Comm'n, 1989 E.C.R. 3283 % 29-30, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61987J0374:
EN:HTML.
129. See Funke v. France, 256-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) $ 44 (1993), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (type "Funke" in the Case
Title line).
130. See GOLDHABER, supra note 8, at 177. Article Eight provides that "everyone has
the right to respect for his private . . . life, his home, and his correspondences." Again,
under the Convention, "everyone" applies also to businesses; see also European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 15, at art. 8.
131. See GOLDHABER,supra note 8, at 177.
132. See Murray, supra note 115, at 547.
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C. Accession as a Means ofReconciliation?
One prominent theme of the Treaty, with respect to accession, is
open dialogue between the EU, ECJ, and ECHR.13 3 The ECJ's current
deference to the ECHR in most matters suggests strong ties already, and
if the EU signs the Convention, those ties presumably will become
stronger. In particular, the Treaty refers to "the existence of a regular
dialogue between the Court of Justice of the European Union and the
European Court of Human Rights; such dialogue could be reinforced
when the Union accedes to that Convention."1 34
The Treaty also indicates that the EU's policy on human rights will
be guided by the Convention. The Treaty's preamble states that
"pursuant to Article 6(3) of the Treaty on European Union, fundamental
rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, constitute part of the Union's
law as general principles."135 Such language may provide headway in
simplifying the relationship between the EU, the ECJ and the ECHR.13 6
However, the Treaty likely will not eradicate tension between the ECJ
and the ECHR. 137
ECHR decisions applying the Convention have involved state actors
only, and provide guidance for state actors. 138 However, the EU is an
international organization with powers delegated by member states.139 It
is unclear to what extent the differences between state actors and
international organizations will affect the ECHR and Convention
interpretation. In particular, one commentator has suggested that the
ECHR's focus on state actors and their concerns may not currently
provide sufficient guidance to the EU and its institutions about correct
Convention interpretation.140 Thus, ECHR jurisprudence, formed to
guide state actors, may be interpreted differently by the ECJ because the
ECJ is part of the EU, an international organization. 14 1  Therefore,
dialogue between the courts, and certain other steps, such as delegating
an EU judge to sit in ECHR deliberations, may be important to foster
133. See Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
establishing the European Community, supra note 10, at Decl. on art. VI § 2 of the Treaty
on European Union.
134. Id.
135. See Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
establishing the European Community, supra note 10, at Protocol on Asylum for
Nationals of the Union.
136. See Murray, supra note 115, at 547.
137. See id.
138. See Van Dijk Commentary, supra note 103, 14.
139. See id.
140. See id. 5 and 14.
141. See id. 14.
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uniformity and clarification in Convention interpretation.142 Specifically,
having an EU judge participate in ECHR cases concerning the EU may
help alleviate stress between different interpretations of the Convention
as it relates to EU law.
A further source of divergence between the ECJ and the ECHR may
concern a provision in the Treaty of Lisbon that gives legal status to the
EU's own instrument concerning human rights, the Charter of
Fundamental Rights ("the Charter").14 3  The Charter outlines
fundamental and human rights, some of which are not included in the
Convention. 14 4 Additionally, some Charter provisions that tend to follow
the Convention actually diverge from it slightly. 14 5  However, such
divergences may be resolved simply by applying the reasoning in
Bosphorus.1 46 The ECHR would give the ECJ discretion to apply the
Charter as long as it closely matched the Convention, and would only
accept an application if a Charter provision offered insufficient
protection of fundamental human rights under the Convention. 147
However, if the EU is to actually accede to and be bound by the
Convention, an argument exists that relevant Charter provisions should at
least mirror the Convention in application. 148 Because both the Charter
and the Convention address the same rights, applying concurrent
provisions identically would be less ambiguous and leave less room for
confusion or divergence between the ECJ and the ECHR. 149
In light of the Charter and accession, the ECJ and the ECHR may
witness a convergence of their case law but simultaneously confront new
potential sources of divergence. Ultimately, from the wording of the
Treaty of Lisbon, the level of conformity likely will depend upon the
actions of the EU in actually acceding to the Convention.150
142. See id. Van Dijk also indicated that another possibility is allowing for the ECHR
to issue advisory opinions to the ECJ.
143. See Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
establishing the European Community, supra note 10, at art. VI § 1.
144. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, pmbl., 2000 O.J. (C
364) 1 (explaining that the protections therein were derived from state constitutions, the
Treaty of the EU, the Convention, and case law of the ECJ, among other sources).
145. For example, the Charter describes the right to marriage in more neutral terms,
which negates the language "men and women" in the Convention. Compare European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 15, at art. 12, with
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 144, at art. 9.
146. See Van Dijk Commentary, supra note 103, 1 16. See also Bosphorus, supra
note 117, T 156.
147. See Van Dijk Commentary, supra note 103, 16.
148. See id. 27.
149. See id.
150. See Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
establishing the European Community, supra note 10, at art. 188N § 8.
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D. Potential Issues in EU Accession and ECHR Authority
Recently, Protocol 14 to the Convention was ratified by all member
states in the Council of Europe. 51  Protocol 14 states that "[t]he
European Union may accede to this Convention." 52  By ratifying
Protocol 14, the Council of Europe took an important step to allow the
EU to accede to the Convention because previously the Convention
restricted membership to states.153  Still, despite the unambiguous
wording in Protocol 14, a number of potential hurdles to accession exist.
The first hurdle exists because, while the Treaty stipulates that the
EU will accede to the Convention, the actual accession requires
ratification by each member state in the EU.154  The Treaty further
restricts EU accession by incorporating a protocol for "preserving the
specific characteristics of the Union and Union law. . . 155 In particular,
this protocol includes the possibility of the EU participating in the
controlling body of the Convention, and the way in which non-member
proceedings will be addressed to the EU or its member states.156
Additionally, Article 2 of the protocol states that the accession will not
"affect the competences of the [European] Union or the power of its
institutions."'57 This provision poses an interesting question: what will
affect the power of EU institutions? Without an additional explanation,
it is unclear whether an adverse ruling by the ECHR would inhibit an EU
institution's power. If the ECJ is an EU institution,15 8 then accession
almost certainly would affect the ECJ's power in some manner.'59
The second potential hurdle to EU accession is that the above
protocol incorporated by the Treaty may conflict with the Convention.
Specifically, Article 57 of the Convention allows for signatories to make
reservations for specific laws that do not conform with the
151. See Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, Protocol No. 14 to the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Amending the Control
System of the Convention, May 13, 2004, E.T.S. 194, available at http://conventions.coe.
int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=194&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG.
152. Protocol No. 14 to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Amending the Control System of the Convention, May 13, 2004, E.T.S. 194,
at art. 17 § 2, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/htmli1 94.htm.
153. See European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra
note 15, at art. 59.
154. Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
establishing the European Community, supra note 10, at art. 188N § 8.
155. Id. at Protocol To Art. 6 § 2 of the Treaty on European Union on the Accession
of the Union art 1.
156. See id. at art. 1 (a)-(b).
157. See id. at art. 2.
158. See EU Commission website, http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/indexen.htm
(including the ECJ as one of the EU's institutions).
159. See Van Dijk Commentary, supra note 103, 14-15.
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16 1 61Convention. 6 0 However, reservations may not be general in nature.
By stating that accession will not affect the Union or its institutions'
powers, the Treaty appears to provide a general reservation for
inconsistencies between EU law and the Convention.162 Therefore, under
Article 57 of the Convention, the EU should attempt to outline with
specificity which laws conflict with the Convention and may be reserved
by the EU. Declaring all inconsistencies in favor of EU laws and powers
would seem to defeat the purpose of acceding to the Convention, and
would directly conflict with Article 57.
A final setback is that the EU is not a sovereign state.163 Its
accession to the Convention might entail additional and unique
difficulties that other signatories, namely sovereign states, did not
encounter.164 For example, the EU has established a body of law that
spans twenty-seven countries.165  Such widespread influence is one
reason to seek uniformity through accession. But such widespread
influence also indicates that accession must be carefully constructed.
Therefore, the EU and the Council of Europe should ensure that their
interests are clearly stated and understood.
In sum, the EU accession likely will occur, though precisely when is
unclear, as both the EU and Council of Europe have expressed a desire to
have the EU as a signatory. However, the terms on which the EU
accedes appear uncertain and likely will be the result of negotiations
amongst the EU member states and between the EU and the Council of
Europe.
IV. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON COMPETITION UNDER DUBUS
Assuming that the EU accedes, EU institutions may fall under the
ambit of the ECHR's jurisdiction.16 6 If the ECHR gains jurisdiction over
the EU and its institutions, the outcome and reasoning in Dubus likely
will be applicable.167 Therefore, EU institutions that operate similarly to
the FBC may be susceptible to an application lodged with the ECHR
under Article 6 of the Convention. One such institution is the European
Commission on Competition ("ECC").
160. See European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra
note 15, T 57.
161. See id.
162. See Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
establishing the European Community, supra note 10, at Protocol to arts. 6 § 2, art. 2.
163. See generally Europa Official EU Portal, Key Facts and Figures,
http://europa.eu/abc/keyfigures/index-en.htm.
164. See Van Dijk Commentary, supra note 103, 14.
165. See Europa Official EU Portal, Key Facts and Figures, supra note 163.
166. Van Dijk Commentary, supra note 103, % 14-15.
167. Id.
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A. ECC v. FBC: A Comparison
While the ECC and FBC serve different purposes, their powers and
operations are analogous.1 68 For example, both organizations operate to
ensure that companies and associations comply with existing law.16 9 To
fulfill their purposes, the ECC and FBC have received extensive
powers. vo
One power that the ECC and FBC wield is the right to investigate
companies for alleged violations,171 though the extent and means of the
investigations can differ.172 A second power common to both institutions
is the power to create a judicial body whose decisions are subject to
review by a higher court. 17 3 Any decision by the ECC may be appealed
to the ECJ, and any decision by the FBC may be appealed to the Conseil
d'Etat.17 4 Moreover, the accompanying regulations for both institutions
indicate that the ECC and FBC serve only as administrative courts. 175 By
characterizing the institutions as merely administrative courts, ECC and
FBC regulations purport to limit jurisdiction to non-criminal
adjudications." 6 The scope of ECC and FBC judgments includes various
remedies, such as reprimands, injunctions, and fines; but specific
168. Compare FBC Fact Sheet, supra note 101, at 5; with Council Regulation (EC)
No. 1/2003, 2003 O.J. (LI) 1, Implementation of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, art.
1, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga-doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!
CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=32003R001&model=guichett [hereinafter Council
Regulation 1/20031.
169. Compare FBC Fact Sheet, supra note 101, at 5 (indicating that the FBC enforces
French banking regulations); with Council Regulation 1/2003, supra note 168, at art. 1
(the ECC enforces EU antitrust laws among others).
170. See, e.g., FBC Fact Sheet, supra note 101, at 4-7; Council Regulation 1/2003,
supra note 168, at arts. 19, 20, and 27.
171. See FBC Fact Sheet, supra note 101, at 4; Council Regulation 1/2003, supra note
168, at arts. 19, 20, and 27.
172. Compare id. Though it is outside the scope of this article, the ECC's
investigative techniques, including dawn raids and raids of managers' homes, may violate
the Convention as well. See GOLDHABER, supra note 8, at 176-77 (indicating that the
ECHR traditionally has afforded greater protection to businesses especially concerning
the right to privacy).
173. See FBC Fact Sheet, supra note 101, at 4; Council Regulation 1/2003, supra note
168, at art. 20.
174. See Council Regulation 1/2003, supra note 169, at art. 20; FBC Fact Sheet,
supra note 101, at 4.
175. See Council Regulation 1/2003, supra note 169, at art. 23; FBC Fact Sheet,
supra note 101, at 3.
176. Compare FBC Fact Sheet, supra note 101, at 3; with Council Regulation 1/2003,
supra note 168, at art. 23.
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remedies can differ in form and magnitude.177 Finally, the ECC and FBC
share the characteristic of transparency-or lack thereof.17 8
While the ECC and FBC derive their powers from legislation and
regulations, the application of their powers is not readily apparent.,79 In
particular, both institutions' investigative and judicial powers are not
clearly distinguished. 8 0  In Dubus, the ECHR reasoned that the
Secretariat General's role in the actual decision was unclear, and may
well have extended beyond an investigative function. 8' Similarly, the
regulations and guidelines for the ECC fail to separate investigators from
final arbiters on a given case.182 Because many cases are opened against
companies based on information obtained by investigators, the lack of a
crisp line distinguishing investigators from judges may suggest that a
given company was prejudged.'
B. The Case for an Article 6 Violation
If the ECHR accepts an application against the ECC alleging a
violation of Article 6 Section I of the Convention, it likely will follow
the reasoning in Dubus. Under a Dubus-like analysis, the same factors
that rendered the FBC liable, namely vagueness of its functions and the
appearance of partiality, could also apply to the ECC.18 4
1. Dubus in Application
The ECC supports the slogan, "making markets work better." 8 1
However, this slogan, like the ECC's operations, leaves to the
imagination exactly how the ECC actually adjudicates claims against
companies. Under Dubus, the ECC first must show that it does not fall
under the threshold application requirements of the Convention, then that
it has provided a fair and impartial tribunal per Article 6 Section 1 of the
Convention.' 86  The ECC likely will fail with both arguments. The
threshold requirements under the Convention, as stated in Dubus, ask
177. Compare FBC Fact Sheet, supra note 101, at 6-7; with Council Regulation
1/2003, supra note 168, at art. 23.
178. Dubus, App. No. 5242/04, supra note 1, % 59-61.
179. See generally FBC Fact Sheet, supra note 101, at 5-6; Council Regulation
1/2003, supra note 168, at arts. 19, 20, 23, and 27.
180. See generally FBC Fact Sheet, supra note 101, at 5-6; Council Regulation
1/2003, supra note 168, at arts. 19, 20, 23, and 27.
181. See Dubus, App. No. 5242/04, supra note 1, 60-61.
182. See Council Regulation 1/2003, supra note 168, at arts. 19, 20, 23, and 27.
183. See Council Regulation 1/2003, supra note 168, at pmbl. 17 and art 11.
184. See Dubus, App. No. 5242/04, supra note 1, 60-61.
185. ECC Website, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_ en.html.
186. Dubus, App. No. 5242/04, supra note 1, % 36-8 and 59-61.
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whether the ECC operates as a tribunal, and whether it conducts criminal
proceedings. 187
a. Tribunal analysis
In determining whether the ECC is a tribunal under the Convention,
the ECHR likely will use the test outlined in Sramek v. Austria.'88 In
Sramek, the ECHR reasoned that under the Convention, a tribunal in the
"substantive sense" is a judicial body whose "function is to determine
matters within its competence on the basis of rules of law, following
proceedings conducted in a prescribed manner."1 89
The Sramek court also indicated that the Regional Authority in
question constituted a tribunal "established by law" because the Austrian
government passed an act providing the Authority's creation.1 90
Similarly, when the ECC renders decisions, it acts within its statutorily
prescribed power and applies EU law.'9 ' Therefore, based solely on
Sramek, the ECHR likely could consider the ECC a tribunal.
Furthermore, because the ECC shares many characteristics with the
FBC,19 2 a finding that the ECC is a tribunal under the Convention would
not depart from the findings in Dubus.193
b. Criminal adjudications analysis
Next, the court must determine whether ECC decisions are criminal
in nature.194 Drawing on Dubus and Engel and Others v. Netherlands,1 95
the ECHR likely will find that the ECC conducts criminal proceedings.
Three factors support such a finding.
The first factor is the severity of the sanction against the defendant.
If the ECHR follows the Dubus court in focusing on the severity of the
sanction against the defendant, then the ECC proceedings should be
considered criminal. 196 For example, the ECC is empowered to fine a
company up to ten percent of the preceding year's total turnover.19 7 For
some companies, ten percent of their yearly turnover equals billions of
187. See id.
188. See Sramek v. Austria, supra note 77, 36.
189 Id.
190. Id.
191. See Generally Council Regulation 1/2003, supra note 168, at pmbl. 22-37.
192. Compare FBC Fact Sheet, supra note 101, at 5; with Council Regulation 1/2003,
supra note 168, at art. 1.
193. Dubus, App. No. 5242/04, supra note 1, $ 38.
194. See id. TT 36-37.
195. See Engel and Others, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A), supra note 73, $T 82-5.
196. See id. TT 37-38.
197. See Council Regulation 1/2003, supra note 168, at art. 23 § 2.
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dollars or Euros.'98 By comparison, the FBC's fine in Dubus was 50,000
Euros, but it was still was found to reach the level of a criminal
proceeding. 199 Furthermore, ECC's discretion to fine a defendant less
than the full ten percent is irrelevant because the ECHR takes into
consideration the maximum fine allowed when determining whether a
proceeding is criminal in nature.200
The second factor concerns other punitive measures against a
defendant. Under Article 2 Section 2 of the ECC's regulations, the ECC
may publicize the initiation of proceedings against a company.2 0 In
Dubus, the court considered both monetary fines and the possible
negative effects on companies as a result of the FBC proceedings.202 The
Dubus court noted that FBC proceedings were public and could severely
impact a company.20 3 Likewise, the ECHR would probably view the
ECC's publication of proceedings against a company as a punitive
measure.
The third factor concerns the way in which ECC regulations
characterize ECC proceedings. Even though the ECC antitrust
regulations explicitly state that ECC proceedings are not criminal in
nature,2 04 for the purposes of the Convention the ECHR likely will
construe them as such. For example, the FBC regulations state that the
banking commission serves only as an administrative court; however,
both the ECHR and the Conseil d'Etat in France have characterized FBC
proceedings as criminal.2 05
The ECHR should be able to apply the Dubus analysis to conclude
that the ECC is a tribunal under the Convention and that it conducts
criminal proceedings. Furthermore, the ECHR may find that the ECC
does not act in an independent and impartial capacity as required under
Article 6 Section 1 of the Convention.
c. The Article 6 violation
The Dubus court noted two failures by the FBC which supported an
inference of partiality.2 06 First, FBC regulations were too vague and did
198. See, e.g., Case COMP/C-3/37.990-Intel. Comm'n Decision (May 13, 2009) ch.
IX § 3.2, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/ICT/intel-provisional
decision.pdf.
199. See Dubus, App. No. 5242/04, supra note 1, 1 37.
200. See id.
201. See Commission Regulation 773/2004, supra note 101, at art. 2 § 2.
202. See Dubus, App. No. 5242/04, supra note 1, 1 37.
203. Id.
204. See Council Regulation 1/2003, supra note 169, at art. 23 § 5.
205. See FBC Fact Sheet, supra note 101, at 3; Dubus, App. No. 5242/04, supra note
1, 37.
206. See Dubus, App. No. 5242/04, supra note 1, % 56, 59-61.
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not clearly outline the commission's separate functions.207 Second, the
General Secretariat's role in the actual decision was unclear.20 8 Thus, it
was not apparent where the investigative function ended and the judicial
function began.209 The ECC suffers from this problem, as well.2 10
Whether the ECC is an impartial tribunal rests on subjective and
objective considerations. 2 1" Although the ECHR did not have a reason to
examine the subjective views of the FBC judge in Dubus, it noted that a
defendant could allege subjective partiality.2 12 The court further noted,
however, that an allegation of subjective partiality is difficult to maintain
because a presumption exists that judges are impartial.213  Therefore,
ECC liability likely will hinge on objective considerations surrounding
the entire ECC proceedings.2 14 As the Dubus court noted, appearances of
impartiality are crucial to a well functioning legal system.2 15 Therefore,
the tribunal has the burden of erasing any specter of partiality. 216
ECC regulations and guidelines provide information on the existing
law and sanctions but are not indicative of the separate functions within
the ECC.217  Rather, the regulations state that the "commission"
investigates suspected violations of EU law and reaches a decision.2 18 In
particular, ECC regulations tend to focus on the ECC's ability to
investigate alleged violations EU law, but they are silent on the ECC's
decision-making process or judicial function.2 1 9 Moreover, ECC
opinions fail to show a separation between its investigators and judges. 220
Intel Corporation221 is a good example because the ECC decision spans
518 pages, of which the ECC's procedure receives five.222 And like the
regulations, the five-page procedural section describes mainly
investigative functions performed by the "commission" and fails to
207. See id. 56.
208. See id. 59-61.
209. See id.
210. See generally Commission Regulation 773/2004, supra note 101.
211. See Dubus, App. No. 5242/04, supra note 1, 53.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 53-54.
216. See Dubus, App. No. 5242/04, supra note 1, 1 60.
217. See generally Commission Regulation 773/2004, supra note 101; Council
Regulation 1/2003, supra note 168.
218. See Commission Regulation 773/2004, supra note 101, at ch. 3, arts. 1-11.
219. See Commission Regulation 773/2004, supra note 101, at chs. 1-3.
220. See, e.g., Case COMP/C-3/37.990-Intel. Comm'n Decision (May 13, 2009),
supra note 198, at ch. II.
221. See, e.g., Case COMP/C-3/37.990-Intel. Comm'n Decision (May 13, 2009),
supra note 198.
222. See id.
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describe any semblance of a judicial process.223 By comparison, the
ECC's operations appear less clear than those of the FBC.224 FBC
guidelines at least partially detail the General Secretariat's duties, which,
in theory, are distinct from the judicial process.225 The ECC, however,
makes no attempt to describe separate functions; rather, it seems the term
"commission" is to serve that purpose.226 To claim that the ECC
operations adequately remove any specter of partiality for a defendant
company runs counter to the decision in Dubus. Therefore, a defendant
company, as in Dubus, may have a persuasive argument that the same
individuals who investigated the case were the same as those who
decided it.2 27
The ECC can argue that its decisions are independent and impartial
because each decision is first submitted to a separate committee for
discussion.22 8 But this argument may fail. First, the committee does not
bind the ECC but merely provides input.229 Second, the ECC chairs the
committee. 23 0 Thus, any inference of partiality likely will be imputed to
the committee, as well.
V. CONCLUSION
The breadth of Dubus' applicability depends on many factors. For
instance, how the EU actually accedes to the Convention may affect how
far the ECHR's jurisdiction reaches. However, if EU institutions become
subject to the ECHR, then companies may find a new avenue for redress
under the reasoning of Dubus. The ECC shares many characteristics
with the FBC and, therefore, may be liable under Article 6 of the
Convention. After accession, the ECC may be forced to reconsider its
operations and to provide a tribunal that can separate judgment from
investigation.
223. See id.
224. Compare FBC Fact Sheet, supra note 101; with Council Regulation 1/2003,
supra note 168, Implementation of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. See also Dubus,
App. No. 5242/04, supra note 1, 1-18.
225. See FBC Fact Sheet, supra note 101, at 5-6.
226. See Commission Regulation 773/2004, supra note 101, at ch. 3. See also Case
COMP/C-3/37.990-Intel. Comm'n Decision (May 13, 2009), supra note 198, at ch. 2.
227. See Dubus, App. No. 5242/04, supra note 1, 60.
228. See Commission Regulation 773/2004, supra note 101, at art. 14.
229. See id.
230. See id.
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